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Pre-closing Liability
Omri Ben-Shahart
I. EMPRO V BALL-CO AND THE PROBLEM OF
PRECONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
A. Preface
Writing about Judge Easterbrook's impact on contract law with-
out commenting on his decisions in ProCD v Zeidenberg' and Hill v
Gateway 20002 is like ordering a Big Mac without the two hamburger
patties. Where is the beef? These two cases are probably the most im-
portant and influential contract law decisions of our era. They re-
shaped the doctrine of mutual assent and received a tsunami of schol-
arly attention. Four major legislative efforts on the national scale-so
far unsuccessful- were triggered by the desire to reverse the holdings
in these decisions, and in the judicial following they garnered.'
Despite the temptation, I choose not to remark on these branches
of Easterbrook's jurisprudence. They have been dissected in a host of
articles, court decisions, and symposia. Contracts doctrinalists largely
hate these decisions-it has become almost an instinct among con-
tracts commentators to collectively condemn these decisions-
whereas some law and economics writers support the decisions.! Else-
where, I argue that ProCD and Hill should be viewed as two of the
most consumer-friendly cases of our era, since they introduce a novel
right to withdraw from a contract.' Here, instead, I am electing to turn
t Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.
I am grateful to Russell Korobkin, Saul Levmore, and Eric Posner for helpful comments.
1 86 F3d 1447 (7th Cir 1996).
2 105 F3d 1147 (7th Cir 1997).
3 Attempts to override or codify these decisions were at the core of several legislative
initiatives, including the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) § 208
(NCCUSL 2002), Article 2B of the UCC, the Revision to Article 2 of the UCC, and the proposed
ALI Principles of the Law of Software Contracts. See, for example, James J. White, Contracting
under Amended Article 2-207,2004 Wis L Rev 723, 736-42; ALI, Principles of the Law: Software
Contracts § 2.02(c) (May 19,2009).
4 For example, my colleague Eric Posner's contribution to this symposium highlights some
of the strengths of the decisions. See generally Eric A. Posner, ProCD v Zeidenberg and Cogni-
tive Overload in Contractual Bargaining, 77 U Chi L Rev 1181 (2010).
5 See generally Omri Ben-Shahar and Eric A. Posner, The Right to Withdraw in Contract Law
(University of Chicago Law & Economics Working Paper No 514, Feb 26, 2010), online at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1569753 (visited May 20,2010). For an excellent review of the scholarly
debate that ProCD triggered, as well as a fascinating empirical perspective on the problem, see
977
HeinOnline  -- 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 977 2010
The University of Chicago Law Review
my attention to another of Easterbrook's resounding contributions:
the problem of precontractual liability.
Writing not long after Texaco v Pennzoil, the case that stunned
the business community and threatened to burst the seam of contract
formation and to find binding commitments before negotiations ended,
Judge Easterbrook stitched the rupture. His decision in Empro v Ball-Co'
has become a staple in the law of "pre-closing" contractual liability. It
has been featured in first-year contracts casebooks as the ultimate
statement for why there is no liability before the closing.
B. The Problem
Empro v Ball-Co is a simple case, almost generic: two firms nego-
tiate a deal, reach some substantial understanding over the terms,
memorialize them in a document titled "letter of intent" or "agree-
ment in principle," condition it on board approval, and also agree to
iron out the remaining details and finalize the deal in a more formal
contract.9 Subsequently, the negotiations collapse, or one party walks
away, and the formal document is never finalized. Is the signed memo-
randum-the preliminary agreement -binding? Is it a contract? Or
can either party freely walk away from it?
As common as this dispute is, there is no simple legal resolution
to it. Sometimes these preliminary documents are intended to be bind-
ing, other times they are not. There are various factors in the sur-
rounding circumstances that can help courts identify the parties' in-
tent: the language of commitment that the parties used (for example,
"nonbinding agreement"); the importance of the missing terms (for
example, price); conduct indicating that the parties believed they had
a commitment (for example, reliance by both parties); and the like."
Some courts are willing to sort through the facts of the dispute to fig-
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Are "Pay Now, Terms Later" Contracts Worse for Buyers? Evidence from
Software Licensing Agreements, 38 J Legal Stud 309, 313-17, 341 (2009). On ProCD and assent doc-
trine, see Richard A. Epstein, ProCD v. Zeidenberg: Do Doctrine and Function Mix?, in Douglas G.
Baird, ed, Contracts Stories 94,95 (Foundation 2007). On ProCD and copyright law, see Guy A. Rub,
Contracting around Copyright The Uneasy Case of Unbundling of Rights in Creative Works (Oct 2008),
online at httpJ/www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/Rub%20Paper.pdf (visited Mar 19,2010).
6 729 SW2d 768 (Tex 1987).
7 Empro Manufacturing Co, Inc v Ball-Co Manufacturing, Inc, 870 F2d 423 (7th Cir 1989).
8 See, for example, John P. Dawson, et al, Contracts: Cases and Comment 380-82 (Founda-
tion 9th ed 2008); Randy E. Barnett, Contracts: Cases and Doctrine 319-22 (Aspen 4th ed 2008);
Robert S. Summers and Robert A. Hillman, Contract and Related Obligation: Theory, Doctrine,
and Practice 487-90 (West 5th ed 2006); Bruce W. Frier and James J. White, The Modern Law of
Contracts 132-38 (West 2005); Edward J. Murphy, Richard E. Speidel, and Ian Ayres, Studies in
Contract Law 427-31 (Foundation 6th ed 2003).
9 See Empro, 870 F2d at 424.
10 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 27, comment c (1979).
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ure out what the parties intended. Other courts prefer to simplify ad-
judication and reduce errors by relying only on formalized agree-
ments, inducing parties to avoid such disputes and be clearer when
they memorialize their understandings.
Interestingly, this is an area of contract law that proved trickier to
regulate than other areas of contract interpretation. The law requires
courts to reach a yes or no decision, all or nothing, contract versus no
contract, freedom to walk away versus full expectation damages,
whereas the situation is fundamentally one of intermediate, halfway,
assent. On the one hand, it is clear that some substantial consensus has
been reached between the parties and that the preliminary agreement
is a milestone in reaching assent, and thus allowing the parties to free-
ly walk away would frustrate their initial accomplishment. On the oth-
er hand, the parties have also made it clear that additional agreement
needs to be reached and some conditions need to be met for there to
be a "contract," and thus enforcing their precontractual understanding
as if it were a contract (and filling its gaps with majoritarian terms)
would deprive each party of the power it sought to maintain-that is,
to reject unfavorable additional terms.
It is not surprising, then, that case law is replete with incoherent
guidance. In one classic case, the court concluded that prior prece-
dents in this area are "in hopeless conflict."" Leading luminaries char-
acterized case law as "confusing," "inconsistent," "all over the board,"
and the "[least] predictable" in the entire area of contract law.12
It is also not surprising, when ambiguity reigns, that a Judge Eas-
terbrook decision would surface with a clear position. It is a typical
Easterbrook decision: short, forceful, persuasive, lights out. Neverthe-
less, I argue that the policy it articulates is socially undesirable.
C. Easterbrook's Solution
The agreement in Empro v Ball-Co was a three-page letter of in-
tent titled "General Terms and Conditions," for the sale of a manufac-
11 Walker v Keith, 382 SW2d 198,199 (Ky 1964).
12 See E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Deal-
ing and Failed Negotiations, 87 Colum L Rev 217, 255-63 (1987) ("[lpt would be difficult to find a
less predictable area of contract law."); Karl N. Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of Contract Offer and
Acceptance, 1., 48 Yale L J 1, 13 (1938) (arguing that rules governing preliminary agreements "are
utterly devoid of ... meaning" when applied to the facts); Gerald B. Buechler, Jr, The Recognition of
Preliminary Agreements in Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions: An Empirical Analysis of the Disa-
greement Process, 22 Creighton L Rev 573,574 (1989) ("[T]he decisions in this area ... continue to
appear both confusing and inconsistent to the point where it is said to be virtually impossible to
predict the outcome in a particular case."); Harvey L.Temkin, When Does the "Fat Lady" Sing? An
Analysis of "Agreements in Principle" in Corporate Acquisitions, 55 Fordham L Rev 125, 130 n 22
(1986) (noting that decisions have come out "all over the board").
2010] 979
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turing company. The price and the payment terms were agreed upon."
The agreement named some issues that needed to be resolved: a non-
compete provision, warranties, a consulting arrangement for the sel-
lers, and "the definitive terms and conditions of this transaction."" The
agreement was conditioned on approval by the board of directors of
the buyer. The crucial term was the "subject to" clause, stating that the
agreement "will be subject to and incorporated in a formal, definitive
Asset Purchase Agreement signed by both parties."" After several
months of further negotiations, and before a final formal agreement
was reached, the seller walked away from the deal to negotiate instead
with a third party. The suit was brought by the buyer to enforce the
letter of intent .
Judge Easterbrook dismissed it. The letter of intent was not bind-
ing, he concluded, because the parties intended not to be bound until
the formal definitive contract was executed. Their use of the "subject
to" language (twice), without otherwise indicating that their commit-
ment was immediate, reinforced the position that the agreement was
not binding until formalized. The board approval escape hatch further
demonstrated that the buyer wanted to preserve the right to walk, and
did not intend to be bound until later. The buyer also secured the right
to get the earnest money back, refusing to commit to even a small
measure of precontractual liability. Finally, Easterbrook pointed out
that when the seller accepted the letter of intent, it stated that "some
clarifications" would be needed. In Easterbrook's words,
"Some clarifications are needed" is an ominous noise in a negoti-
ation, foreboding many a stalemate. Although we do not know
what "clarifications" counsel had in mind, the specifics are not
important. It is enough that even on signing the letter of intent
[seller] proposed to change the bargain, conduct consistent with
the purport of the letter's text and structure."
Thus, the combination of the subject to wording, the board approval
conditions, and the clarifications needed statement indicated that no
contract was entered and the parties were free to walk away.
13 Empro, 870 F2d at 424.
14 See Letter of Intent from Gary J. Graf, President, Empro Manufacturing Co, to John
Szilage, Louis Szilage, and Steve Szilage, Ball-Co Manufacturing (Nov 2, 1987), attached as an
exhibit to Verified Complaint for Specific Performance, Damages and Temporary Restraining
Order, Empro Manufacturing Co, Inc v Ball-Co Manufacturing, Inc, No 88-C-2154 (ND III filed
Mar 15,1988) (on file with author).
15 See Empro, 870 F2d at 424.
16 Id.
17 Id at 426.
980 [77:977
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Easterbrook also dismissed the buyer's more modest claim to at
least recover its reliance expenditures -those costs the buyer sunk in
reliance on the letter of intent, including the cost of negotiating with
the seller, investigating the seller's business, and preparing the acquisi-
tion. If there is no contract, there is no liability, however measured:
Outlays of this sort cannot bind the other side any more than pay-
ing an expert to tell you whether the painting at the auction is a
genuine Rembrandt compels the auctioneer to accept your bid."
Easterbrook is clear about the rationale for his decision. Approaching
agreement in stages is "a valuable method of doing business."" Early
in the negotiations parties do not yet know if they will succeed or fail.
It is in their interest to reach understandings without fear that they
will be forced into an agreement that they do not want, one that in-
cludes terms to which they did not agree. As Easterbrook explained in
a later case with similar facts,
If any sign of agreement on any issue exposed the parties to a
risk that a judge would deem the first-resolved items to be stand-
alone contracts, the process of negotiation would be more cum-
bersome (the parties would have to hedge every sentence with
cautionary legalese), and these extra negotiating costs would
raise the effective price.20
II. AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION: INTERMEDIATE LIABILITY
Easterbrook's no-liability solution is sensible when contrasted with
the opposite solution of full contractual liability. The parties' represen-
tations suggested that they expected some more negotiations and were
not yet ready to call it a deal. Having to choose between two polar al-
ternatives, Easterbrook shows us that the full-contractual-liability solu-
tion is too aggressive and thus the zero-liability outcome is inevitable.
The problem with this methodology is that it unnecessarily nar-
rows down the set of possible solutions to two. Between the two polar
outcomes of zero liability and full liability lies a whole continuum of
intermediate solutions. Since we are dealing with a situation of partial
assent, would it not be more appropriate to attach legal consequences
that reflect this intermediacy -that assign liability somewhere in the
interval between zero and full contractual liability? I argue that such
an intermediate measure of liability exists, that it is flexible enough to
correspond to the intermediate degree of assent reached between the
18 Id.
19 Empro, 870 F2d at 426.
20 PFT Roberson, Inc v Volvo Trucks North America, Inc, 420 F3d 728,731 (7th Cir 2005).
2010] 981
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parties, and that it dominates the two polar liability regimes. The first
step is to explain why an intermediate-liability rule is desirable; I then
introduce a specific intermediate precontractual liability rule; finally I
apply it to the pre-closing scenario of Empro.
A. Normative Grounds for an Intermediate-Liability Regime
In complex deals, as Judge Easterbrook acknowledges, it is tech-
nically impossible to tackle all issues simultaneously. Consensus is
achieved piecemeal; one by one issues are resolved. Usually, when
enough such resolutions are amassed, the parties then decide that
some memorialization of the agreed-upon terms is useful, and that a
structured plan for the remainder of negotiations is desirable.2 1 This
milestone is not the end, but rather a stage toward a more complete
agreement, which is sometimes specifically referred to in the prelimi-
nary understanding.
What is the value of this pre-closing memorialization? Surely, the
act of signing a letter of intent is more than a secretarial archiving of
items. One possibility is that by taking stock of what is already agreed
upon and recognizing the mass of accomplishment, the parties create
some inertia for the remainder of the negotiations. The parties may
believe that the incentive to overcome the remaining issues may in-
crease after most of the agreement is recorded, or that the remainder
can be delegated to agents (lawyers), or that some more information
is needed to nail down the final issues, or that some of the issues that
remain open could be sidestepped, if the likelihood of some contin-
gencies declines.
It is often recommended in negotiation manuals that the harder
issues should be avoided early on in the negotiation, as they might
"place unbearable strain on the overall settlement process."2 The psy-
chological basis for this paradigm is a "momentum" notion: if the par-
ties tackle easier issues first and build as much understanding as pos-
sible, they increase their own motivation and incentive to find ways to
resolve the contentious issues.2 The effort already spent on achieving
21 See Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary
Agreements, 120 Harv L Rev 661, 664 (2007) (explaining the presence of "binding preliminary
agreements to pursue a profitable transaction").
22 David A. Lax and James K. Sebenius, The Manager as Negotiator: Bargaining for Coop-
eration and Competitive Gain 97, 221 (Free Press 1986) (arguing that parties should avoid con-
tentious issues that "may render agreement impossible").
23 This notion is familiar in international negotiations. See Geoffrey R. Watson, The Oslo
Accords: International Law and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreements 309 (Oxford 2000)
("One puzzle-solving heuristic is to solve the easy part of the puzzle first; once that part is solved,
the harder parts of the puzzle may seem easier."); Fred Charles Ikl6, How Nations Negotiate 1,18
[77:977982
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partial agreement and the dynamic of goodwill that this effort gener-
ated accord a more amenable context for the resolution of the remain-
ing issues. 4 The recording of the preliminary understanding, under this
view, helps marshal the parties' goodwill and motivation to continue.
The economic basis for this momentum paradigm could be an in-
complete-information account: as issues get resolved, the parties up-
date their beliefs about the expected surplus from the deal. And each
party also knows that the other party is performing the same updating.
There can be a strategic factor here: each party may believe that by
formalizing early understandings, the counterparty becomes more
eager to finalize the deal, which would make it possible to extract
even greater concessions from that party5
It is one thing to record and memorialize the preliminary agree-
ment. It is another thing to be committed to it. Can the parties be
committed only to what they agreed? Why would such gradual com-
mitment, coupled with an intermediate magnitude of liability, be ad-
vantageous in these environments of negotiations-in-stages? One type
of benefit, often mentioned in the negotiation literature, is the cogni-
tive effect associated with a gradual compromise. Concessions that
may be hard to make if framed as a lumpy, all-at-once departure from
one's ideal terms may be easier to digest in a series of small slivers.'
Partial commitments effectively carve up the otherwise hard-to-
swallow large commitment. This is the same logic soon-to-be-married
couples invoke in making gradual premarital commitments (for ex-
ample, buying shared assets, moving into a shared residence, opening
joint accounts). If it were completely costless, in terms of nonlegal re-
percussions, to walk away anytime prior to the full formal agreement,
these milestones would have less value, and, short of self-deception,
they would not help the parties make a gradual assent towards cohabi-
tation. A norm (or legal rule) of unrestricted freedom to retract, to
reopen resolved issues, and to break the negotiations for any reason,
would undermine the gradual compromise idea."
(Harper & Row 1964) ("If there is a conflict about many issues, the less controversial ones
should be solved first because agreement will lead to further agreement.").
24 Lax and Sebenius, The Manager as Negotiator at 221-22 (cited in note 22); Robert H.
Mnookin, Scott R. Peppet, and Andrew S. ThIlumello, Beyond Winning: Negotiating to Create
Value in Deals and Disputes 251 (Harvard 2000).
2 See, for example, Lax and Sebenius, The Manager as Negotiator at 96-97 (cited in
note 22) ("Negotiations often leave much ambiguity with the tacit understanding that a definite
resolution of the issue perhaps strongly favoring one party will later become necessary.").
26 See, for example, Robert B. Cialdini, Influence: How and Why People Agree to Things 27
(Morrow 1984) ("The trick is to bring up the extra[] [expenses] independently of one another so
that each small price will seem petty when compared to the already-determined much larger one.").
27 Lax and Sebenius, The Manager as Negotiator at 279-80 (cited in note 22) (emphasizing
the informal sanctions of breaking contingent agreements); Roy J. Lewicki, et al, Negotiation 100
2010]1 983
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Another benefit of an intermediate commitment arising from
precontractual understandings is associated with the "integrity" of
negotiations. If parties are free to walk away anytime prior to the full-
blown contract, the negotiation arena will be appealing to individuals
who are not "serious" and are not truly interested in dealing. The val-
ue of such a surrounding to the serious traders would then diminish.
The signal that entrance to negotiations transmits with respect to the
propensity of a party to work towards a deal is more powerful the
greater the sanction for walking away.8 This is a standard-and desir-
able -sorting mechanism.
Still, it might be conjectured that this is too crude a sorting device,
that it will deter parties who are potentially serious but not ready to
assume some liability. Namely, even a partial precontractual commit-
ment -any limitation of the freedom from contract- might "chill" the
incentives to bargain, reducing the incidence of surplus-creating nego-
tiations and thus reducing, rather than enhancing, the parties' payoffs.29
In Judge Easterbrook's words, parties would fear that "they have bar-
gained away their privilege to disagree on the specifics," which would
undermine their incentive to enter precontractual understandingsn
This intuitive conjecture is misguided. If there is a chilling effect
caused by some measure of precontractual liability, it is disproportion-
ately weighty on nonserious parties -those who are less likely to enter
the contract and are thus more likely to be subject to the precontrac-
tual liability rule. This disproportionate burden on the nonserious par-
ties would deter their entry. The more serious parties would find the
liability regime desirable. For one, it would deter and filter out waste-
ful negotiations. Moreover, it would induce more efficient reliance
investments." As recognized in a court decision to which Judge Eas-
(Irwin 2d ed 1994) (advocating that negotiators strategically make only tentative commitments
until an entire agreement is reached).
28 This "signaling" effect is recognized in the international negotiations literature. See, for exam-
ple, Lloyd Jensen, Soviet-American Behavior in Disarmament Negotiations, in I. William Zartman, ed,
The 50% Solution: How to Bargain Successfilly with Hijackeis; Strikers Bosses Oil Magnates; Arabs;
Russians; and Other Worthy Opponents in This Modern World 288,289 (Anchor 1976).
29 See E. Allan Farnsworth, 1 Contracts § 3.26 at 361 (Aspen 2d ed 1998) (describing any
limitation in the freedom to contract as having a "chilling effect" of discouraging parties from
entering negotiations); Jason Scott Johnston, Communication and Courtship: Cheap Talk Eco-
nomics and the Law of Contract Formation, 85 Va L Rev 385,416-17,445-46 (1999) (arguing that
precontractual liability would "cause(] the market to shrink" and would force parties to utilize
more cautious bargaining strategies, wasting opportunities for efficient trade).
30 Empro, 870 F2d at 426.
31 For the argument that liability can enhance precontractual reliance, see Avery Katz,
When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotia-
tions, 105 Yale L J 1249, 1270-71 (1996); Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Re-
liance, 48 Stan L Rev 481,483-84 (1996). For a formal analysis of the particular rules of liability
that can induce efficient reliance, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Omri Ben-Shahar, Precontrac-
[77:977984
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terbrook concurred, "The parties may want assurance that their in-
vestments in time and money and effort will not be wiped out by the
other party's footdragging or change of heart or taking advantage of a
vulnerable position created by the negotiation." 32 Such precontractual
investments take many forms. Parties forego opportunities to nego-
tiate with other partners; give up offers and promotions; invest in rela-
tionship-specific training and assets;33 acquire information; build ca-
pacity; and so forth. These investments increase the value that the po-
tential deal would subsequently divide.
In the absence of some kind of commitment from the counterpar-
ty and liability to back it up, each party would fear that these invest-
ments are more likely to be wasted or expropriated. Without liability,
it is more likely the other party would turn around and walk away.
And even if the other party stays, greater reliance investment would
make the investing party more vulnerable to hold-up. Thus, if negotia-
tions lead to a contract, the benefits a party could enjoy from its own
reliance investments are diminished by the ability of the other party to
expropriate some of the surplus it creates. Since the other party could
threaten to walk away, it could reopen negotiations and resplit the
postinvestment surplus. This hold-up problem would reduce the incen-
tive to invest. From a social perspective, the reduced levels of precon-
tractual reliance that result are inefficient in two different ways: deals
that do get formed generate a lower surplus, and some efficient deals
that could have been formed are never entered into."
According to this view, parties who enter into preliminary agree-
ments without expressly stipulating the liability consequences have in
mind a commitment that is neither full-contract nor zero liability, but
rather carries some binding force. They want to accord each other
some measure of security, thereby encouraging the other to keep in-
vesting in the success of the relationship and to screen out, ex ante,
frivolous partners. Each party must sacrifice some of its own freedom
to walk away in order to encourage the other party to take a chance.
The benefit from higher overall investment, which would materialize
if a contract eventually forms, more than offsets the cost of restricting
the freedom to walk away.
tual Reliance, 30 J Legal Stud 423, 457 (2001); Schwartz and Scott, 120 Harv L Rev at 686-91
(cited in note 21).
32 Venture Associates Corp v Zenith Data Systems Corp, 96 F3d 275, 278 (7th Cir 1996).
33 See Hoffman v Red Owl Stores Inc, 133 NW2d 267,268-69 (Wis 1965).
34 See Bebchuk and Ben-Shahar, 30 J Legal Stud at 429-30 (cited in note 31); Craswell, 48
Stan L Rev at 553 (cited in note 31); Katz, 105 Yale L J at 1302 (cited in note 31); Schwartz and
Scott, 120 Hary L Rev at 690 (cited in note 21).
2010] 985
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B. A Specific Intermediate-Liability Rule
Any precontractual liability rule has to answer two questions:
(1) when is a party liable for breaking off negotiations; and (2) what
are the legal remedies available to the disappointed party. As we shall
see, question (2) is easier to answer. It is question (1)-the grounds for
liability -that is more difficult to answer. Surely, not every incident of
negotiation termination should lead to liability. Most negotiations
simply fail, or go stale, or are terminated by one party for good reason
after giving the negotiations a good honest chance. Thus, much of the
thinking about precontractual liability, and most of the legal innova-
tions in the field, identify some conception of fault as the basis for in-
flicting liability on a party who abandons negotiations or refuses to
follow through on an agreement in principle. The party who is more at
fault has to compensate the party who is less at fault, at least for the
latter's reliance costs.
The problem, of course, is to identify what would constitute faulty
refusal to negotiate. Fluid conceptions like "bad faith" and culpa in
contrahendo merely restate the problem or provide labels in Latin for
the solutions, but do not advance the ball. Instead, they often lead to
the type of skepticism that Judge Easterbrook rightly voices: that va-
gueness would breed excessive precontractual regulation and would
merely introduce anxiety to the negotiations. What is needed is a
compact conception of what it is that should be regarded as bad
faith -which subset of negotiation breakdowns is socially undesirable.
This question cannot be answered without first articulating the
exact benefit the liability is trying to generate. In the discussion above,
I mentioned several potential benefits to precontractual liability-
inducing reliance investments, protecting the integrity of the negotia-
tion arena, making agreement easier to accomplish, and more. Each of
these objectives might justify a different liability rule. It would be
overly ambitious to claim that all these goals can be optimally ad-
dressed by the same rule. Thus, in the discussion here, I focus on one
objective: optimal pre-closing reliance.
In my previous writings on this issue, some done in collaboration
with Lucian Bebchuk, I explored a variety of intermediate-liability
rules that, under some assumptions, provide optimal incentives to in-
vest precontractually." Some of these rules place unrealistic informa-
tional burdens on courts. There is one regime, however, that places
35 See Bebchuk and Ben-Shahar, 30 J Legal Stud at 449-52 (cited in note 31); Omri Ben-
Shahar, Contracts without Consent: Exploring a New Basis for Contractual Liability, 152 U Pa L
Rev 1829,1838-39 (2004); Omri Ben-Shahar, "Agreeing to Disagree": Filling Gaps in Deliberately
Incomplete Contracts, 2004 Wis L Rev 389,406-07.
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only a modest informational burden on courts and can lead to optimal
incentives in a subset of negotiations -those in which parties reached
a preliminary understanding.
Imagine a rule that imposes liability on a party who retracts from
the terms to which it had previously agreed-any of the terms in-
cluded in the preliminary understanding." Sometimes the preliminary
understanding is formalized in a letter of intent, making it easy to
identify. Other times it may require some subtlety to identify the set of
terms that a party agreed to-the terms that the party represented to
be acceptable. Once these terms are identified, a retraction would be
any attempt by the party to reopen the negotiations over these terms
in order to extract a more favorable. division of the surplus, or an out-
right refusal to negotiate the remaining open terms, thereby violating
the plan to proceed with the negotiations. The party who retracts
would be liable for the other party's reliance expenditures -those
incurred after the preliminary understanding.
This no-retraction norm is recognized in a variety of negotiation
contexts. In international negotiations, for example, when a negotiat-
ing party manifests its position, it is considered improper to "revert to
a harder position from a more conciliatory one." 3 Treaties are nego-
tiated article by article, and partial understandings cannot be reo-
pened and must be preserved in the final agreement." Even the
agreed-upon terms in agreements to agree, famously unenforceable in
private law, cannot be reopened. In treaty law, "there is little doubt
that parties can enter into legally binding 'agreements to agree.'". Or,
to take another example, in collective-labor negotiations parties to
preliminary and tentative agreements have an obligation to further
negotiate in good faith." Courts have developed heuristics to deter-
mine what counts as bad faith. Interestingly, it is often held that with-
drawing from tentative agreements or making regressive proposals
36 Variants of this rule were applied in several famous cases. See, for example, Hoffman,
133 NW2d at 275 (imposing liability on a franchisor who retracted from terms it previously
represented); Grouse v Group Health Plan, Inc, 306 NW2d 114, 116 (Minn 1981) (imposing
liability on an employer who revoked his employment offer, even before the offer was accepted);
Arcadian Phosphates, Inc v Arcadian Corp, 884 F2d 69,70 (2d Cir 1989) (imposing liability on a
seller who changed its position as to what terms would be acceptable).
37 Ikl6, How Nations Negotiate at 22-23 (cited in note 23).
38 Id at 99 ("The very fact that the parties laboriously negotiate with each other to settle
their issues point by point constitutes an implied promise that yesterday's work will not be de-
stroyed tomorrow by reopening these partial agreements.").
39 Watson, The Oslo Accords at 65 (cited in note 23).
4 See National Labor Relations Act, 29 USC § 158(a)(5), (b)(3).
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(two forms of "retraction"), if not reasoned by a change of circums-
tances, are evidence of bad-faith bargaining."
Notice that this no-retraction rule is not equivalent to enforcing
preliminary understandings as contracts. If they were contracts, liabili-
ty for retraction would equal the expectation interest and the court
would need to supplement all the missing terms. Also, this rule is not
equivalent to a rule that effectively prohibits renegotiation of agreed-
upon terms. Under the rule considered here, a party can, after the pre-
liminary understanding, push to reopen its terms and insist on more
favorable terms. But this strategy is no longer free. The intermediate
liability he would face, if that strategy led to negotiation breakdown,
does not block renegotiation; it merely affects the bargaining range in
the renegotiation stage by restricting the retracting party's profitable
maneuvers. It thus provides more bargaining leverage to a party that
relied on the agreement.
What about the missing terms? Many preliminary agreements
leave some issues open, anticipating that they would be further re-
solved before the closing. (These are the "clarifications" Judge Eas-
terbrook refers to.) If courts were to use standard gap-fillers to sup-
plement the missing terms, the preliminary agreement would be trans-
formed into a full-blown, enforceable contract. Instead, and consistent
with the no-retraction idea, the gaps should be filled with terms most
favorable, within reason, to the defendant. In other words, a party who
wants to enforce the preliminary agreement must concede the open
terms to its counterpart.
Can a party disguise a retraction and circumvent the no-
retraction rule by making unreasonable demands related to one of the
missing terms? Technically, this would not conflict with the parties'
original understanding. It would have the same effect of ending the
relationship, but without incurring any precontractual liability. For
example, if the parties agreed upon an express price to be paid in sev-
eral deferred installments, a party wishing to retract could cause the
deal to fail by insisting on an unreasonable interest rate. How would
the intermediate-liability rule prevent such circumvention?
In order to avoid masqueraded retractions, a court would have to
determine if any party's demands regarding the missing negotiable
terms are unreasonable. A party would be deemed to retract when he
insists on an unreasonable term, or is unwilling to enter the contract
even under the specification of the missing term that, within the range
that the parties could reasonably have intended, is the most favorable
41 See, for example, Mead Corp v NLRB, 697 F2d 1013, 1022 (11th Cir 1983); Oklahoma
Fixture Co, 331 NLRB 1116,1118 (2000).
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to him. Rejecting such a package is as unreasonable as retracting an
explicit agreement. Essentially, then, a party entering a preliminary
agreement is making a commitment to its terms, supplemented in all
the open issues with terms most favorable, within reason, to him. He
will not be forced to accept, or face liability for rejecting, a contract
less favorable than this package of agreed terms plus the most favora-
ble gap-fillers.
Thus, this liability rule is "intermediate" relative to full contrac-
tual liability in several important ways. First, it kicks in only if the oth-
er party is willing to concede the open terms-a less than likely event.
One can imagine that many parties to preliminary agreements would
not be willing to concede the open terms in a manner most favorable
to their counterparts. In such cases, there is no liability and each party
would be free to walk away. Second, even when the liable party is
compelled to be part of the deal, the burden involved is quite minor. It
is a deal that contains the terms he agreed to in the preliminary un-
derstanding, supplemented by the terms most favorable to him. Final-
ly, if, despite it being favorable to him, the liable party refuses to ac-
cept this deal, the liability is measured by reliance damages-only
those expenditures reasonably undertaken after the agreement.
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The dark line in the figure traces the rise of liability as the parties
agree to more terms. Initially, when negotiations begin, and all the way
until the preliminary understanding, the magnitude of liability is zero.
Eventually, if and when the parties reach the closing stage and full
agreement, the magnitude of liability is highest (full expectation liabil-
ity). In the interim, between the preliminary agreement and the clos-
ing, liability is intermediate. At the time of the preliminary agreement
it rises above zero, to reflect the option to enforce, but remains below
full liability, to reflect the one-sided terms of this option and the lower
measure of damages. As the parties agree to more terms and iron out
one detail after another, this intermediate liability increases, to reflect
the fact that the enforcing party has incrementally fewer terms to con-
cede to the other party.
This rule has several attractive features that other approaches do
not offer. First, it decouples the preliminary incomplete agreement
into a set of two different complete agreements, one that the seller can
enforce (with pro-buyer terms) and one that the buyer can enforce
(with pro-seller terms). This is an additional dimension that can over-
come deadlocked negotiations. Second, unlike the full-contract solu-
tion, here the deal that a plaintiff can enforce is no worse than what
the defendant could have intended when he entered the preliminary
agreement. It is the only deal to which it can confidently be said that
the defendant manifested her "constructive" intent to be bound. What
reasonable grounds would the enforced-against party have to reject
such a favorable deal? Third, it allows parties to enter preliminary
agreements without the fear that they are binding themselves to un-
wanted terms that some future activist court might install in the con-
tract. Nor are they bound to some fuzzy and unpredictable obligation
to negotiate in "good faith." Thus, it addresses Judge Easterbrook's
concern that parties ought not fear that they bargain away their privi-
lege to disagree on the specifics. The knowledge that they may be sur-
rendering to a deal that is most favorable to them is not a deterrent
but rather an inducement to enter a preliminary agreement.
Most importantly, under this rule, parties have the optimal incen-
tive to make reliance investments at the pre-closing period-the time
between preliminary understanding and the closing of the formal con-
tract. This rule succeeds in inducing efficient reliance because it
shields an investing party from the hold-up problem. By formally
sanctioning any retraction from the preliminary understanding, the
rule changes the incentives of the parties to retract and negotiate dif-
ferent terms. While renegotiation might still occur, the retracting party
must restrain its claims so as to avoid negotiation breakdown and in-
cur liability. This party cannot extract any of the added surplus created
by the other party's reliance. He cannot hold up the other party and
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exploit the fact that reliance costs are sunk, because reliance costs are
no longer effectively sunk. Any such hold-up attempt gives the other
party a chance to recoup its reliance costs by imposing retraction lia-
bility on the holding-up partner. Thus, a retracting party who has to
pay reliance damages is effectively limited in its ex post bargaining
strategy and would not engage in hold-up attempts. Since the investing
party cannot be held up, its incentive to invest would be optimal.42
Finally, the rule is easy to opt out of, by stamping the preliminary
agreement with any statement that would indicate intent to remain in
one of the polar outcomes. Parties can state "enforce this" on the let-
ter of intent, or-conversely-that it is "nonbinding." To be sure, every
precontractual liability regime, including the one chosen by Judge
Easterbrook, is a default rule. My argument throughout this Part is
intended to demonstrate that the intermediate-liability rule is a supe-
rior default because it increases social welfare, and thus it is the one
that most parties would prefer most of the time.
C. Applying the Pre-closing Liability Rule to Empro v Ball-Co
Judge Easterbrook provided only a brief description of the facts
of this case before concluding that the parties never intended the let-
ter of intent to be binding. He emphasized that the parties left some
issues open, and those issues were not resolved. Hence they could not
have intended the memorandum to be a binding contract." A crucial
underlying question, though, was not answered in the decision. Why
did the seller, who was the party that initiated the negotiations in the
first place and agreed to the terms in the letter of intent, decide to
walk away from the negotiations? Was this a true failure to reconcile
the positions on the open issues, or was it an outright retraction by the
seller? Easterbrook's decision makes sense if this were indeed a case
of a dead end in the negotiations over the remaining issues. It makes
less sense if, say, the seller suddenly decided that it wants to double
the price -if this were a case of the seller's regret and retraction.
The correspondence between the parties in the period that fol-
lowed the letter of intent (which I pulled out from the district court's
file") demonstrates back-and-forth negotiations after the letter of in-
tent, primarily over one sticky issue: the nature of the security to be
maintained by the seller. Of the $2.4 million price, $1.75 million was
deferred, to be paid with ten-year promissory notes. The seller was
42 For a formal proof that reliance damages are sufficient to generate efficient precontrac-
tual reliance, see Bebchuk and Ben-Shahar, 30 J Legal Stud at 435-38 (cited in note 31).
43 Empro, 870 F2d at 426.
44 See Letter of Intent from Gary J. Graf (cited in note 14).
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legitimately concerned about the buyer's indebtedness, and hence
demanded some security arrangement. The buyer agreed that the in-
ventory and equipment of the purchased company would serve as col-
lateral. The seller demanded that in addition the real estate of the
company would be included as security.41 This impasse was not re-
solved and the seller turned to sell to another bidder.
Had the security arrangement been an open issue, it would be
right to conclude that the failure to resolve it indicates the absence of
a binding contract. For one, it is not clear how to fill the gap to make
the agreement complete. More importantly, given the structure of this
deal as a credit transaction, the credit terms are its essence. If the par-
ties made their initial agreement subject to resolution of this security
issue, the failure to resolve it means that there was no mutual assent,
no intent to be bound.
But the security arrangement was not an open issue. It was re-
solved in no uncertain terms in the letter of intent, in a manner consis-
tent with the buyer's position. The letter of intent stated, in para-
graph (3):
c. Empro shall sign and deliver to Ballco a ten (10) year Install-
ment Promissory Note in the amount of $1,750,000 .... Empro
shall secure said Promissory Note with the inventory and equip-
ment of Ballco.41
The letter of intent continues to specify the issues that need to be re-
solved to reach the final agreement, including, for example, a non-
compete agreement and a consulting arrangement with the outgoing
directors of the company. But nowhere in the agreement does it say
that the security arrangement needs to be further negotiated. This part
of the agreement was resolved.
Indeed, it was only in the subsequent negotiations that the seller
made a new demand for additional security. The seller retracted his
earlier agreement as to which assets suffice for security and reopened
this issue in an attempt to extract a more favorable term. When the
buyer rejected this demand, the seller walked away.
If this is the proper account of the negotiation failure, the inter-
mediate-liability regime I outlined above would impose some liability
on the seller. Specifically, the rule would accord the buyer an option.
He would be entitled to bind the seller to a contract consisting of all
the agreed-upon terms (which include the letter of intent's term on
the security arrangement) supplemented by provisions favorable to
45 Empro, 870 F2d at 424.
46 See Letter of Intent from Gary J. Graf (cited in note 14).
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the seller. Thus, with respect to the issues that were specifically left
open (for example, the noncompete provision) and were not resolved
in the subsequent negotiations, the buyer must concede them to the
seller if he wishes to bind the seller to the letter of intent.
It could well be, though, that this account overstates the degree of
assent manifested in the letter of intent. Judge Easterbrook empha-
sized that at the time of signing the letter, the seller informed the buy-
er that "some clarifications are needed in Paragraph 3(c) (last sen-
tence)."7 Easterbrook viewed this as an early sign of the ensuing stale-
mate. Does "some clarifications needed" mean "nothing is agreed
upon, everything can be reopened"? Or does it merely mean "we need
to iron out some technicalities in implementing the agreement"? In-
deed, some of the issues raised by the seller-who will pay accrued em-
ployee vacation, what accounting version of the "prime lending rate"
will be used, what happens to the security if the buyer resells the com-
pany, and more-qualify as minor technicalities and were eventually
resolved. The record shows that the buyer surrendered to every one of
the seller's demands over these issues. It is not clear, though, that revis-
ing the essence of the security arrangement was a "clarification."
In any event, regardless of the position the judge takes concern-
ing whether issues were truly left open, the intermediate-liability rule
I proposed would prescribe a result under which the buyer could en-
force a contract if he were willing to concede the seller's positions
over the non-agreed-upon issues. If the set of open issues were narrow,
including only the technicalities I mentioned, the option would be
more valuable to the buyer and more burdensome on the seller. If,
instead, the set of open issues were broader and included also the se-
curity provision, as Judge Easterbrook perceived, the option would be
less valuable to the buyer who would need to concede some additional
issue in order to bind the seller. The more issues left open -the "thin-
ner" the initial agreement-the less valuable is the buyer's option and
the less will the buyer rely. Thus, with more issues left open, the bur-
den borne by the seller who wishes to walk away but must surrender to
the buyer's option to enforce is lighter. In this manner, liability effec-
tively increases (continuously) with the measure of assent.
Notice how the intermediate-liability rule reduces the stakes. The
judge no longer needs to assign an extreme and very specific meaning
to the vague and casual statement "some clarifications needed." It no
longer has to choose between "nothing is binding," or "we have a con-
tract." This language can mean what many parties probably think it
means: "some things-but not everything-still need to be worked
47 Empro, 870 F2d at 426.
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out." All that remains for the judge to decide is which issues were
closed (and thus cannot be reopened) and which remained open. The
latter, if unresolved in the subsequent negotiations, must be conceded
by the enforcing plaintiff.
Unfortunately, Judge Easterbrook did not partition the issues ac-
cording to this methodology. The statement "some clarifications
needed," which the seller included in the cover letter attached to the
preliminary agreement, was taken as eliminating any kind of commit-
ment, even to the express terms of the agreement. This is an extreme
result. It does not try to reconcile the seller's simultaneous signing and
requesting clarifications in a way that would make both acts meaning-
ful. Rather, it empties the signing of the letter of intent of any mean-
ingful consequence.
The seller's violation of the no-retraction liability rule would lead
to a recovery of damages. Since the purpose of this liability rule is to
induce optimal reliance, it suffices to compensate the buyer for its re-
liance costs. Here, the buyer's reliance costs were nontrivial: hiring at-
torneys to proceed with due diligence, making several trips to investi-
gate and review the company, paying for appraisals, and participating in
several negotiation meetings. These are socially desirable pre-closing
investments and they ought to be protected by a liability regime.
CONCLUSION: WAYS OF CRITICIZING A JUDGE
The analysis here suggests that judges do not need to walk the ra-
zor's edge between no liability and full contractual liability every time
they adjudicate a pre-closing case in which the agreement was subject
to a formal contract. Currently, the razor's edge methodology leads
courts to seek clues about the parties' intent in factors that are too
subtle, while recognizing that this formula is often ambiguous.4 There
is confusion whether the parties' intent is an issue of law or fact;
whether parol evidence can be included; whether the subject to state-
ment is a condition precedent, and the implications of such category. It
is often hard to interpret what the parties' intent was when they used
this language. Courts tend to infer from the breakdown of subsequent
negotiations that the original agreement was not binding. Against this,
and in attempt to enrich the dichotomous nature of the liability prob-
lem, I have shown that a pre-closing agreement can be binding but not
final. The No-Retraction principle provides one possible grounding for
such a mechanism, setting the magnitude of liability on a continuum
that reflects the quantum of agreement reached by the parties.
48 See, for example, Interway, Inc v Alagna,407 NE2d 615, 618-20 (Ill App 1980).
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It is not altogether fair, you might think, to criticize a judge for
failing to apply a "new" rule, one that is not part of the accepted juris-
prudence in the area. Judge Easterbrook felt compelled to choose be-
tween two polar outcomes. This is the standard methodology that most
courts follow. He may have made the choice seem too easy, overlooking
the magnitude of assent already reached, but the choice is still plausible.
The idea of no-retraction, which I advanced here, is not a proposal
to reform the law and install a new doctrine of precontractual liability.
Rather, it is an analytical framework for a doctrinal trend already in
motion. In a subtle and interesting way, many courts have been break-
ing away from the dichotomous, all-or-nothing methodology, developing
instead "categories" of precontractual liability. Using existing doctrines
like the duty of good faith, promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, and
implied contract, common law courts occasionally impose liability on
parties who walk away from advanced negotiations without a good rea-
son.49 Even Easterbrook's court has been at times innovative in this
area." The problem with these emerging practices is their ad hoc nature.
What is bad faith? How early should parties begin to rely on the nego-
tiations? How severe should the remedy be? For precontractual liability
to make sense (and be predictable), it needs to rest on a coherent con-
ceptual foundation. The No-Retraction norm provides one possible
foundation. Viewed as such, it is neither a "new" rule nor a proposal for
reform, but merely an organizing criterion.
The critique, then, is not of the specific outcome in the case. It is a
critique of the jurisprudence that Empro prominently represents,
which adheres to the all-or-nothing module of liability. The concerns
that Judge Easterbrook invokes in choosing the no-liability out-
come -predictability, freedom to choose one's partners, and loyalty to
the parties' expectations-point not to either one of the polar out-
comes, but to an alternative methodology, expanding the choice of
intermediate solutions.
49 For prominent examples, see Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America v
Tribune Co, 670 F Supp 491, 499 (SDNY 1987) (holding that even a letter of intent obligates
parties to negotiate); Itek Corp v Chicago Aerial Industries, Inc, 248 A2d 625, 629 (Del 1968);
Copeland v Baskin Robbins USA, 117 Cal Rptr 2d 875,880-81 (Cal App 2002) (holding that an
agreement to agree obligates parties to negotiate); Hoffman v Red Owl Stores Inc, 133 NW2d
267,274-75 (Wis 1965) (finding that precontractual understandings, even short of an agreement,
create reliance liability).
50 See Venture Associates Corp v Zenith Data Systems Corp, 96 F3d 275,278 (7th Cir 1996)
(discussing various liability measures for breach of an obligation to negotiate).
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